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As the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act made its way through Congress in the fall of
2008, one repeatedly voiced complaint was the enormous, judicially unreviewable discretion it
vested in Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson as he acquired up to $700 billion of assets and
securities on the government’s behalf.  “We’re essentially creating a King Henry here who is
going to be able to buy any type of financial instrument he wants from any financial institution
anywhere in the world,” complained Congressman John Culberson, a Republican from Texas. 
His Democratic colleague from Virginia, Robert Scott, objected that Congress “should not give
unlimited discretion to buy assets at prices obviously higher than fair value to an administration
frequently accused of cronyism and favoritism.”   Yet when two conservative groups denounced1
the newly enacted law for violating a constitutional ban on the delegation of legislative power,
prominent law professors simply shrugged.  The bailout “certainly tests the outer limits of
Congressional delegation authority,” Laurence H. Tribe allowed, but the law was hardly
unprecedented.  Many other vague delegations had survived judicial review.2
Professor Tribe had a great deal of history on his side.  From the Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887 through the New Deal, legislation creating federal agencies usually endowed officials
with broad delegations of power to act in the public interest.  By 1951 such delegations were so
commonplace that the law professor Kenneth C. Davis could compile a long list, including grants
of the power to set “just and reasonable rates,” to remove “unreasonable obstructions” to
navigation, to end “unfair methods of competition,” and to regulate broadcasters in accordance
with “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”    For American reformers, “modern3
government” required discretion for administrators; to insist that administrators proceed in a rule-
bound fashion was to call for “a laissez-faire role for government.”   When, in 1944, the Austrian4
1
emigre Friedrich A. Hayek warned that only governments bound “by rules fixed and announced
beforehand” could deliver their peoples from the “road to serfdom,” even New Dealers who were
starting to worry where unbridled discretion might lead could not see how to embrace Hayek’s
version of the “Rule of Law” without renouncing the whole of the American reform tradition.5
In fact, Hayek was anticipated by one of the principal early theorists of the American
administrative state.  Ernst Freund’s great treatise, The Police Power (1904), became the
American progressive’s counter to any conservative who invoked an older tradition of
“constitutional limitations” on American statebuilding.   Like the “transatlantic” reformers6
Daniel T. Rodgers studied in his magisterial Atlantic Crossings (1998), Freund believed that
Europe’s city planning, social insurance, rural cooperatives and other attempts “to limit the social
costs of aggressive market capitalism” were presumptively appropriate models for the United
States.   He felt the same way about European approaches to implementing those programs. 7
Above all, he expected to see the United States, like other modernizing countries, follow
Germany in establishing a Rechtsstaat, that is, a polity in which the legitimate activities of the
state and the “the sphere of freedom” of the citizenry were “exactly define[d] and inviolably
secure[d].”   Despite Freund’s best efforts, however, the Rechtsstaat was one European import8
that never established itself on American shores.
The shipwrecking of the Rechtsstaat may be observed in a quarrel between Freund and
another leading scholar of administrative law in the United States in the early twentieth century,
Felix Frankfurter.  The two had a great deal in common.   Both had lived in Europe before taking
up residence in the United States.  Freund was born in the United States to German parents in
1864, educated in Germany, and emigrated in 1884, settling in New York City.   Frankfurter was9
2
born in Austria eighteen years after Freund and emigrated with his family to New York’s lower
east side in 1894, the year Freund left the city to join the faculty of the University of Chicago. 
Both actively participated in the reform movements of the Progressive Era.  Jane Addams
eulogized Freund as “the finest exponent in all Chicago of the conviction that as our sense of
justice widens it must be applied to new areas of human relationships or it will become stifled
and corrupt.”  Frankfurter labored tirelessly on behalf of the National Consumers League and
progressive industrial unions, such Sidney Hillman’s Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America.  Both protested the deportation of suspected radicals in the Palmer Raids of 1919.  10
Both rejected the widely held dogma, most authoritatively pronounced by A. V. Dicey, that
equated the Rule of Law with the freedom to challenge any administrators’ deprivation of a
private right in a proceeding conducted in “the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts
of the land.”   Each haled the other as a great scholar of administrative law.  Frankfurter11
dedicated his casebook on the subject to “Ernst Freund, Pioneer in Scholarship.”  Freund repaid
the compliment in his review of the book by placing Frankfurter “at the forefront of the field of
administrative law in this country.”  12
For all that, the two disagreed fundamentally about administrative law.  Their
disagreement took definite shape in the years 1921 and 1932 as the two shared responsibility for
the leading foundation-supported research program in their field, the Commonwealth Fund’s
Committee on Administrative Law and Practice.  As the senior and better published of the two,
Freund prepared a comprehensive agenda and expected Frankfurter to recruit lawyers from
among the recent graduates of his administrative law seminar to carry it out.  Frankfurter had his
own ideas, however; ultimately, each man directed his own phase of the program as he saw fit. 
3
Freund conducted a “statutory survey” of administration in the federal government, New York,
and Germany; Frankfurter oversaw a series of “intensive studies” of individual agencies.  The
culmination of Freund’s survey was the virtually unreadable Administrative Power over Persons
and Property (1928).  Although the summa of more than three decades of Freund’s teaching and
writing, the book’s influence was negligible, especially on the younger generation of legal
academics who dominated the field after World War II.  The monographs of Frankfurter’s
students cast a much longer shadow.  As a work of scholarship, the most impressive was I. L.
Sharfman’s massive investigation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, published in the
1930s, but an earlier study of the Federal Trade Commission by Gerard C. Henderson influenced
more American lawyers.  Decades after its publication in 1924, law students still learned its
object lessons about how administration could go wrong and what lawyers could do about it from
a lengthy extract in Henry Hart and Albert Sack’s Legal Process.13
No single factor explains why Freund lost and Frankfurter won.  Freund’s taxonomic
approach to legal scholarship obscured his meaning and limited his readership.  Henderson’s
vivisection of a faltering federal agency was much more engaging reading.  Personal
temperament and institutional location also mattered.  Freund’s charm could engender great
affection in his students, but, as he acknowledged, he lacked Frankfurter’s capacity to inspire and
cultivate disciples.  He occupied a somewhat marginal place at the University of Chicago’s law
school after a curriculum he proposed was rejected in 1904.  Frankfurter, in contrast, regularly
culled the best students from Harvard’s large LL.B. classes and its smaller pool of graduate law
students.14
More important than any of these factors was a difference of opinion on the merits of
4
administrative discretion.  Freund hoped to bring the Rechtsstaat to America. Nineteenth-century
German liberals had developed the concept to constrain the discretion of revanchist, aristocratic
bureaucrats, but Freund found it no less serviceable in an American polity dominated by political
machines.  For Freund, administrative discretion was an evil, tolerable only until experience
under open-ended standards suggested the content of a certain rule.  Frankfurter’s outlook was
quite different.  He had been a government lawyer in the presidential administrations of Theodore
Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, when the need for trained administrators was, as he put it,
“becoming a more accepted commonplace of statecraft.”   He thought that the governance of the15
modern societies required more subtle adjustments of social interests than any rule could
anticipate.  If Freund thought the first job of administrative law was the constraint of
administrative discretion, Frankfurter thought it was the freeing of administrators from the
oversight of common-law courts.  From his vantage point, Freund’s Rechtsstaat left too little to
the professional judgment of administrators.
1
The Commonwealth Fund was founded in October 1918 by the widow of Stephen V. Harkness,
John D. Rockefeller’s silent partner, with an endowment of $10 million.  Its president was
Edward Harkness, Stephen’s only surviving son; the other members of the Board of Directors
were Edward’s law partner and fellow Yale man, Samuel H. Fisher; the president of a trust
company, who served as treasurer; and George Welwood Murray, John D. Rockefeller’s favorite
lawyer and a member of the New York City law firm Milbank, Tweed.   In 1919 Max Farrand, a16
5
historian at Yale University, became General Director.  He oversaw the Fund’s portfolio of
scholarly research, including the administrative law project, until his departure in 1927 to run the
Huntington Library.17
The Commonwealth Fund’s first grants supported research on child welfare, public
health, and medicine, but in 1920 the Board of Directors authorized the annual expenditure of up
to $50,000 on legal research and organized a committee to oversee the program.  At its first
meeting the Legal Research Committee approved Farrand’s proposal for a study of administrative
agencies.  These had multiplied in the preceding two decades.  Even before the war, a moribund
Interstate Commerce Commission had been revived and new agencies, such as Food and Drug
Administration and the Federal Trade Commission, created.  Growth on the state level was even
more dramatic, in the guise of public utility commissions, workers’ compensation schemes, and
tax equalization boards.  The United States’ entry into the Great War brought the nationalization
of the railroads and merchant marine, a burgeoning of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
creation of agencies of war insurance and finance.   By 1920, even Charles Evans Hughes, who18
had fought for a public utilities commission while governor of New York, wondered “in view of
the precedents now established whether constitutional government as heretofore maintained in
this republic could survive another great war even victoriously waged.”19
In what one historian has termed the “unusual political turmoil, economic disruption and
social disorder” following the Armistice, many reformers came forward with proposals to build
upon, rather than dismantle, the wartime state.  Some found their way to the Board of Directors
of the Commonwealth Fund; in early 1919 Samuel Fisher wrote to Farrand of “the many people
in town,” all “talking reconstruction.”   Perhaps at the suggestion of Murray, an alumnus and20
6
booster of Columbia’s law school, Farrand consulted its dean, Harlan Fiske Stone, for possible
topics for legal research.  With two experts on his faculty--Thomas Reed Powell and Thomas
Parkinson--Stone suggested administrative law.   Farrand may also have consulted Roscoe21
Pound, who had recently written on the place of administration in a polity dominated by
common-law courts.22
In any event, Stone’s and Pound’s ideas prominently appeared in the proposal for a Legal
Research Committee that Farrand submitted to the Board of Directors in June 1920.  In 1916
Stone had warned that “the entire legal system is in the process of undergoing re-examination in
the supposed interest of reform” and argued that university-based scholars ought to take the lead. 
In 1920 Farrand quoted Stone in arguing to the Commonwealth Fund’s directors that professors,
rather than practitioners or judges, were the proper people to conduct “scientific” investigations
of the law.   To convey the urgency of the moment, Farrand employed a theme that Pound had23
sounded earlier that summer.   In “the critical period of American legal history” following the24
Revolutionary War, Farrand explained, the English common law was in danger of being replaced
with “all sorts of crude projects.”  Just in time, however, James Kent, Joseph Story, and other
treatise writers did “what no one else could”: they stated the common law in a form that judges
could easily understand and use in their decisions.  In 1920 law teachers had a “somewhat
similar” job.  Once again, the common law was confusing, uncertain and unpopular.  Once again,
it lagged behind “rapidly changing economic and industrial conditions.”  And, once again, “we
must rely upon legal scholars, especially in the Law School, to do the constructive work
necessary.”25
But just what constructive juristic work were the law professors to undertake?   A few
7
years later the American Law Institute would be created to “restate” the various branches of the
common law in an attempt to preserve the place of common-law courts in the American polity. 
The proposal had captured the imagination of the great corporation lawyer Elihu Root, who
opened the Carnegie Corporation’s coffers for the project, in the hope that a revivified common
law could hold its ground against the advances of administrative agencies with their “great and
dangerous opportunities for oppression and wrong.”  Root believed that “these agencies of
regulation must themselves be regulated” and looked to common-law courts to do the job.   This26
was the orthodox position within the American legal profession.  At least since the publication of
Dicey’s Law of the Constitution in 1885, Anglo-American lawyers had viewed the common law
not just as one legal system among many but the apotheosis of liberty.  With Dicey, they equated
the Rule of Law with a guarantee that matters of private right be finally determined by common-
law judges sitting in courts with general jurisdiction rather than“specialist judges” in
administrative courts.27
From the start, it seems, the Commonwealth Fund took a more cosmopolitan approach. 
In words borrowed from Stone, Farrand told its Board of Directors that the study of American
legal institution ought to be conducted “in comparison with other legal systems.”   Sometime28
between July 1920, when the Board voted to create a Legal Research Committee, and July 1921,
when that body finally convened and approved “an inquiry into administrative practices affecting
private right,” Farrand had settled on Ernst Freund to chair the project and elicited a research
agenda from him.  Not surprisingly, judicial review of administrative decisions figured in
Freund’s plans; he had been teaching that subject since 1904, and his casebook, published in
1911, covered it at length.   But Freund recognized that law could arise outside the courts.  He29
8
proposed that the statutes of Congress and a few state legislatures be studied to “segregate,
systematize, and analyze” the provisions that held administrators in check and that “actual
administrative practices” be investigated to make clear the informal norms and routines that
protected private interests.  English legislation and practices were surely relevant, Freund
allowed, but so were the experiences of France and Germany–a controversial claim for American
lawyers, because it muddied Dicey’s distinction between the Anglo-American Rule of Law and
the Continental droit administratif.    30
A more parochial oversight committee might have balked, but the Commonwealth Fund’s
Legal Research Committee included some of the most thoughtful and wide-ranging jurists of the
day.  Three law deans signed up: Stone, Pound, and the University of Chicago’s James Parker
Hall, who chaired the committee.  Benjamin Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals also
served, as did the patrician New York City lawyers C.C. Burlingham and John G. Milburn.  31
Cardozo, at least, felt that the law deans held “the balance of power.”  The Legal Research
Committee did insist that the committee overseeing the administrative law project include a
practicing lawyer, but the one obtained, Walter Fisher, was himself a leading civic reformer and
had worked with Freund in the campaign for a municipal charter for Chicago.32
The Legal Research Committee approved Freund’s preliminary program for research and
even swallowed Farrand’s recommendation that Felix Frankfurter be recruited to the project.  For
a brief interval it seemed that the Board of Directors might balk at the Harvard law professor,
who had acquired a reputation as a dangerous radical by harshly criticizing the trial of the labor
organizer Tom Mooney and the mass deportations following the Palmer Raids of 1919-20. 
George Welwood Murray, for one, had his doubts, “not because [Frankfurter’s] point of view is
9
apt to differ from mine, but because he seems so ill-balanced in any point of view.”  But Farrand
was persistent and persuasive: the Commonwealth Fund’s project “would be liable to serious
criticism” should it omit so well-known an expert, and other members of the administrative law
and legal research committees could be counted on to veto “any radical conclusions” he might
advance.  Besides, Farrand argued, “it would be safer to have Frankfurter on the committee than
it would be to have him criticize it from the outside.”  In the end, Murray acquiesced and assured
Farrand that he would object only “in a very glaring case.”33
From July through October 1921 Freund developed his proposal for a project on
administrative law and practice while Farrand assembled a committee to execute it.  For a time,
Thomas Reed Powell seemed a likely recruit.  Like Freund, he was a student of the Columbia
University political scientist Frank J. Goodnow as well as a lawyer.  Powell had inherited his
teacher’s courses when Goodnow left to become president of the Johns Hopkins University and
had produced mind-numbingly precise articles on the review of administrative decisions by writs
of mandamus and certiorari.  By 1921, however, he had already reinvented himself as a brilliant
and acerbic scholar of constitutional law and no longer regarded administrative law “con-amore.” 
After a brief dalliance, he bowed out.   Powell’s colleague Thomas Parkinson did attend an34
organizational meeting, but Frankfurter, repelled by his “annoying ignorance of the field and
corresponding dogmatism, shallowness and bluff,” refused to serve with him, and he was not
considered further.35
Although Goodnow would ultimately join Freund, Frankfurter, and Walter Fisher on the
letterhead of the Commonwealth Fund’s “Administrative Law and Practices Project,” in fact only
Freund and Frankfurter vied for leadership of the enterprise.  From late 1921 through the spring
10
of 1922, their contest would be quite sharp, as Frankfurter refused to sign onto the research
agenda that Freund, as the senior scholar, assumed he should set.  Once Farrand settled the matter
by permitting each professor to direct his own program of research, the conflict was usually
dormant, but it flared up at crucial moments, most notably in the summer of 1926, when Freund
presented the Commonwealth Fund with a manuscript embodying over thirty years of thought on
administrative law.
2
We do not know exactly what Roscoe Pound wrote to provoke Ernst Freund in October 1913, but
apparently it included a slighting reference to “administrative law people.”  “I can assure you that
there are mighty few of us and of a very different type from what you imagine,” Freund protested
in reply.  “Administrative Law stands not for administrative power but for control of
administrative power, and if I favor delegation [of legislative power to administrators] it is only
because I believe that control of delegated power is more capable of development than control of
legislation.”  Evidently when Pound read the words “administrative law,” he focused on the word
“administrative” and associated it with unbridled discretion; Freund focused on the word “law”
and associated it with the constraint of “arbitrary power.”36
The novelty of the term for Anglo-American lawyers may have contributed to Pound’s
mistake.  As the law professor Jerry Mashaw has shown, the United States did have
administrative law avant la lettre in the guise of the common law of officers.  That body of law,
however, existed in a different jurisprudential universe, described by Morton Horwitz, Elizabeth
11
Mensch, and Joseph Singer, in which rights and their correlative duties defined most relations,
and the state itself was conceived of one rights bearer among many.  In such a universe, the
existence of actual loss without a legal remedy--damnum absque injuria--was a troubling
anomaly.   37
The Progressive Era brought a new way of thinking about societies, economies, and
polities.  In place of “the autonomous economic man, the autonomous possessor of property
rights, the autonomous man of character,” writes the historian Daniel Rodgers, the progressives
offered the “consciously contrived,” harmonious society.   They insisted on seeing individuals as38
born into and living within going concerns: social classes, ethnic groups, skilled crafts, society as
a whole.  The new “social” or “sociological” approach had broad implications for law, explored
in Pound’s brilliant critiques of the constitutional law of the Supreme Court, the construction of
“socialized” juvenile and municipal courts, and the law professor John Welsey Hohfeld’s system
of jural relations.  In Hohfeld’s system a common-law rule that created an area of damnum
absque injuria was no anomaly but a conscious choice of a legal regime, which he called the jural
relation of “privilege-no right.”   Within this realm, which lay between “plain illegality” and39
plain “liberty,” Freund argued, administrators, acting under the police power, could lawfully
restrain private acts that were “legitimate but attended with peril or liable to abuse.”  40
Administrative law was “the system of legal principles which settle the conflicting claims of
executive or administrative authority on the one side, and of individual or private right on the
other.”41
Freund grounded his definition of administrative law in the German ideal of the
Rechtsstaat, a state bound by fixed and certain rules that demarcated spheres of legitimate state
12
action and of individual liberty.  “In order to secure with certainty and predictability a sphere in
which the citizen could act free from the interference of the state,” writes the historian Kenneth
Ledford, “Rechtsstaat doctrine sought to replace both unwritten customary law and arbitrary
bureaucratic law with a system of law that was general and autonomous, public and positive,
aiming at generality in legislation and uniformity in adjudication . . . .”   The ideal was given an42
institutional dimension in the mid-nineteenth century by Rudolph von Gneist, a Prussian jurist
and statesman who taught at the University of Berlin.  Turning to English constitutional history
for inspiration, he found in the eighteenth-century justice of the peace a model civil servant–a
member of the gentry, to be sure, but one “purged of . . . selfish class interests” by his voluntary
and uncompensated governance of the locale for the good of the nation.   From the English case43
Gneist developed a proposal for an independent administrative judiciary consisting of mixed
bodies of administrators and judges drawn from the ordinary law courts.  Between 1872 and
1883–that is, while Freund was studying law in Germany--Prussia established administrative
courts more or less along the lines Gneist proposed.  They soon established their independence
from the bureaucracy in a series of notable cases.  As Ledford has argued, they “brought into
being a meaningful rule of law in Germany,” albeit one of a procedural nature that was
vulnerable to “the strongly formalist notions of German positivist legal theory.”44
Freund must have heard Gneist lecture while studying at the University of Berlin, but he
did not write about administrative law until 1893, after he had taught the subject himself and
began studying with the political scientist Frank J. Goodnow at Columbia University.   At that45
point Gneist loomed large for Freund, because Goodnow had attended Gneist’s lectures and
acknowledged a great debt to the master in his Comparative Administrative Law (1893).  Soon
13
Freund was praising Gneist’s history of the English constitution, deploring the American doctrine
of sovereign immunity for putting officials “beyond the pale of those principles which constitute
what the Germans call the Rechtsstaat,” and applauding Prussia’s administrative courts, which he
identified as Gneist’s creation and “the most ingenious solution of the problem how to combine
bureaucracy and self-government.”46
For Freund–as for Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville and the Egnlishman James Bryce--
the most fundamental and distinctive phase of the American state was its dearth of centralized
national bureaucracies.   Freund captured the difference between Europe and America in a47
distinction between “bureaucratic government” and “self-government.”  Bureaucratic
government prevailed in Europe, where the chief executive was “the head of an army of officials
who derive their function and duties directly or indirectly from him, whose hierarchical
organization culminates in his person, who have received a special training, who serve the state
for life, and whose interests are therefore to a large extent identified with those of the
government, and somewhat dissociated from those of the people.” “Self-government” prevailed
in the United States.  “Not only are the people the source of governmental power,” Freund wrote,
“but they exercise that power themselves” by selecting laymen to govern them and only briefly
entrusting them with power, so that they never lose “their contact with the people.”  Because
public offices were not joined in a hierarchy of authority and control, some other means of
keeping them in check had to be found.  Writing in 1893, Freund thought that those means were
specific statutory delegations to officials, coupled with review of their actions in courts of general
jurisdiction.  He was convinced that most executive functions were so minutely regulated that
they had become ministerial acts.  “We may truly speak of a government by law and not by men,”
14
Freund maintained, for the “officer has no one to look to for instruction and guidance, except the
letter of the statute.”48
That is, in theory the officer did not.  Freund feared that in practice America’s
administrators took their lead from political bosses.  The Jacksonian principle of rotation in
office might have been intended to replace aristocratic government with rule by the people, but it
had become “an instrument for partisan purposes.”  “Professional office-seekers” had become “a
separate class of the community, just like the bureaucracy in Europe,” Freund complained, “only
without the same training and expertise.”49
German jurists developed the idea of the Rechtsstaat to keep a royal government from
playing favorites; in the United States Freund invoked it to constrain “the shady and corrupt
aspects” of patronage politics.   Where questions of fact and law in matters of private right were50
involved, he looked to the judiciary to keep administrators within the bounds of the law.  On one
score he favored the American system of review by courts of general jurisdiction over the
German administrative courts: the latter, he observed, were “not entirely independent,” because
they mixed administrators with ordinary judges.  On balance, though, Freund believed that the
German system better protected private rights: its procedures were simpler, and it gave disputants
the option of appealing upward through a bureaucratic hierarchy as well as into the administrative
courts.  His preference grew stronger in the early twentieth century as American courts started to
defer to the findings of fact of administrative agencies rather than decide factual questions de
novo.51
In 1894 Freund still hoped for “an infusion of bureaucratic or professional elements” into
the American system of self-government.  Until that happy day, he looked to legislatures to
15
“narrow as much as possible the sphere of discretionary action” by fixing “precisely and
completely” how and when administrators should act.  “Compliance with these conditions will
place all individuals upon a basis of equality, and the administration is bound by fixed rules
which are controllable and enforceable by the courts.”  The Rechtsstaat would come to America,
Freund predicted, in the guise of detailed delegations of legislative power that converted
unreviewable discretion into ministerial acts.52
He could hardly have been more wrong.  For some years he took comfort from New
York’s passage of the Raines Liquor Law in 1896.  Under earlier law, the decision to award or
revoke a liquor license to persons of “good moral character” had been committed to the
discretion of local officials.  Although New York’s judges had professed to see “little to fear
from an abuse” of this discretion, Freund was convinced that machine politicians had used it
reward friends and punish enemies and that a statute was needed to “take liquor licenses out of
politics.”  The Raines Law substituted rule for discretion by detailing the factors left unspecified
in the old, open-ended standard.  Henceforth, the applicant who made an adequate showing of
compliance with these requirements received the requisite certificate as a matter of course.53
Freund would invoke the Raines Law in all of his major writings on administrative law. 
He soon realized, however, that whatever it heralded for licensing, it was not typical of
delegations of legislative power to independent commissions, a trend that included the revival of
the moribund Interstate Commerce Commission, the creation of state public utility commissions,
and the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914.    If, as Freund insisted, “the54
progress of law should be away from discretion toward definite rule,” if “all discretion in
administration . . . is an anomaly and the modern tendency is to reduce it to a minimum,” had
16
America turned its back on history?55
Freund persuaded himself that it had not and that in fact “the gradual and rather
unconscious drift” of American public policy was “toward the displacement of discretion” in
administrative power over private rights.   First, he believed that legislation could provide56
administrators with clearer principles if legislators would draw upon legal and social expertise. 
In Europe, Freund noted, important legislation was almost always drafted by the ministries.  “It is
prepared by high officials, trained and experienced jurists and economists, who work under the
guidance and advice of practical administrators with all the official information of a centralized
bureaucracy at their command.”  In the United States, statutes had long been the product of “a
large political body possessing no particular qualifications,” yet Freund saw many signs that an
era of “intelligent legislation based upon expert advice” had at last arrived.  He could point to his
own service as Illinois’s delegate to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
States Laws, the enactment of his bills on illegitimacy and divorce, the creation of legislative
reference bureaus in Illinois and Wisconsin, and the American Bar Association’s establishment
of a special committee on legislative drafting.   Although his suggestion that graduate study in57
law be devoted to “discovering definite and demonstrable working principles of legislation” had
found few takers, Harvard had seemingly endorsed his call for law professors to frame legislation
by awarding him the James Barr Ames Prize for his treatise Standards of American Legislation
(1917).58
Freund also looked to the agencies themselves to develop principles in matters of private
right and even of expediency.  In a lecture first delivered in 1914, Freund denied that recent
delegations of legislative powers to administrative agencies amounted to “a shifting from judicial
17
rule to administrative discretion.”  In fact, the change was “from discretion to rule and not vice
versa.”  Fixed rules had not prevailed under the old system of judicial enforcement of regulatory
statutes because legislation had left vague standards of “reasonableness, safety and adequacy” to
the considerable discretion of the jury, “the least responsible of all the factors of government.”  In
criminal proceedings, jurors sympathized with the accused, because one did not “lightly send a
person to prison.”  In civil cases, “liberally inclined” juries favored plaintiffs, especially in suits
against corporations.  In contrast, an administrative agency was responsible to “the force of
circumstances” and “surrounded by procedural guaranties and other inherent checks.”  Much
more so than legislators and jurors, administrators were obliged to defend their decisions.  For
this reason, they tended to respect precedent and expert opinion and to “evolve principle out of
constantly recurrent action.”59
When, in 1914, Freund predicted that American administration would transform itself
into the Rechtsstaat, he had to concede that the history of discretionary administrative power in
the United States to that point had been “rather discouraging.”  “The next ten or twenty years,” he
thought, would be decisive.”   One can imagine, then, his excitement six years later when the60
Commonwealth Fund suddenly materialized with funds for a study of “administrative law and
practice” in the United States.  Freund still believed that “unstandardized power” over private
rights was “undesirable per se” and “hardly conformable to the ‘Rule of Law’”; now he would
have the chance to see whether the Rechtsstaat had in fact come to America by writing a
twentieth-century American counterpart to Gneist’s great study of local government in
eighteenth-century England.   The prospect must have dazzled Freund, but Felix Frankfurter61
would find it far less alluring.
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3Freund met Frankfurter for the first time in October 1921 and was impressed by the Harvard
professor’s command of administrative law.  “I found him keenly alive to the importance of the
work, fully familiar with every problem I touched upon, and generally admirable in his attitude,”
Freund reported to Farrand.  The Harvard law professor was also “eager to help,” albeit “mainly
through assistants.”   Despite Frankfurter’s suggestion that only the national government be62
studied, Freund proceeded with his original plans and prepared a lengthy prospectus that
projected studies of Massachusetts, New York, Wisconsin, and the city of Chicago, as well as the
federal government.  The main object of the inquiry, as Freund saw it, was “to ascertain whether
private interests are adequately safeguarded under delegated administrative action.”  To this end,
investigators would take up six principal problems: “(1) the legitimate province of delegated
legislation or rule making power; (2) the legitimate sphere and extent of administrative
discretion; (3) the problem of separating incompatible functions; (4) what constitutes due
process, in an equitable, not merely constitutional sense, in administrative procedure; (5) a clear
theory of judicial relief; and (6) simplification of remedies.”  63
Freund explained the need for “a reasonably complete survey” of several jurisdictions in
straightforward terms.  “In that way alone is it possible to get a view of the growth and extent of
administrative power, and the legislative practice in regulating or not regulating it,” he explained
to Farrand.  “Upon the basis of a few selected subjects you cannot form a general judgment.”  64
Left unsaid were his methodological assumptions.  In Germany Freund had been taught to see the
material world as the manifestation of the spirit of an age, which would be revealed if studied
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“systematically.”  To study “law as a system,” he had written in 1904, was to see it as “a body of
reasoned principles,” of rules “consciously founded in principle” and of principles embodying a
“common purpose.”   Thus, Freund, in the philosopher Morris Cohen’s judgment, “always65
sought to find a genuinely rational pattern” in the law he studied.  For administrative law, the
pattern he hoped to discern was a tendency to do away with discretion.   Only a comprehensive66
study could reveal whether Americans had embraced the Rechtsstaat.
Felix Frankfurter had his own notion of Wissenschaftlichkeit.  “Much of research,” he
wrote to Freund, after reading his prospectus, “is a painful process of proving what you already
know, or at least feel.”  Yes, the “objective demonstration of a scientific study” was called for,
but studies of a handful of agencies would suffice, at least initially.  “The generalizations, the
philosophizing, the ultimate answers” would emerge in due course.  Frankfurter also questioned
Freund’s formulation of the object of the inquiry as “whether private interests are adequately
safeguarded.”  Would it not be more accurate to ask whether administrative law afforded
“substantive justice both to public and private interests”?  he asked.  “After all, we can’t consider
whether private interests are safeguarded without equally considering the public interests that are
asserted against them.”   The younger scholar concluded deferentially.  “The field needs your
leadership, for no one has so deeply and comprehensively made the field his own.  To whatever
extent I can–if you think me of use–I should deem it a real privilege to work with you.”67
Frankfurter shared his views with Farrand, who found them to be line with Stone’s
complaint that Freund ought to get “sufficiently down to a concrete practical job” of proposing
specific reforms.  Farrand told Freund that he would have to confine himself to “a very limited
field so that we can be sure of concrete results.”  Whatever the value of Freund’s agenda for “the
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student of the subject,” the Chicago professor still had to “convince the Directors of the
Commonwealth Fund that their expenditures have not been misused.”   Farrand proposed that68
the interested parties confer after the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools in Chicago in late December 1921.  Farrand, Freund, Frankfurter, and several other
scholars of administrative law met on three successive days.  When the meeting broke up on
January 1, Freund’s unified research project had been discarded.  Instead, Freund was to prepare
his own survey of statutes that created administrative power over private rights in the United
States, New York, England, and Germany.  Frankfurter was to oversee a series of “intensive”
studies, mostly of federal agencies.69
These turned out to be elaborations of papers written by Frankfurter’s students.   In the70
wake of the Chicago meeting, he pushed for a larger share of the Commonwealth Fund’s largess
at Freund’s expense and went out of his way to puncture Freund’s claim that rule was replacing
discretion in administrative law.   “I wonder if you weren’t struck by the recurrence by Freund to
several instances that seemed to him very interesting, the existence of which he didn’t want
‘lost,’ but which, under questioning (like the N.Y. liquor license cases) turned out to be merely
instances, and frankly admitted to be such by him,” he wrote to Farrand.  A “comprehensive”
volume was too great a task to expect “even from Freund in two or three years.”  Although such a
treatise would be valuable, much like Freund’s Standards of American Legislation, its effect “on
professional opinion and on the stimulation of research in general” would be “very slight.” 
Freund thought “in terms of German philosophic Grundrisse,” Frankfurter complained, when
what was needed were “the necessary factual demonstrations out of which the general problems
and the unifying elements will emerge.”  As he later put it, administrative law had to be studied
21
“functionally, and not analytically.”  Whatever typology Freund came up with would be
idiosyncratic and no more deserving of the Commonwealth Fund’s endorsement than anyone
else’s “pet schemes.”71
Frankfurter’s opposition at Chicago had left Freund shaken.  Not only had the younger
man insisted on “the paramount importance of the intensive studies” and dismissed “the present
value of anything like a comprehensive survey,” Freund recorded in a note to himself,
Frankfurter had rejected as “mere examples” the evidence upon which Freund had based his
entire understanding of the field.  Freund considered Frankfurter’s own notion of empirical
research inadequate.  “It may be that a mass of statistical and factual material will result in
scientific demonstration of the merits or demerits of administrative practices and of the
legislation underlying them, but it may also be that the material will be inadequate to support
‘scientific’ generalizations, or that even the fullest material may prove in its nature incapable of
yielding demonstration.”72
In the following years, Freund and Frankfurter proceeded on separate tracks, to the
satisfaction of at least Roscoe Pound, who assured Farrand that it was “distinctly a good thing
that Freund is approaching administrative law from one side and Frankfurter from another.”  73
Frankfurter paired present or former students with various topics: Eleanor Bontecou with federal
rule-making, John Cheadle with the U.S. Customs Service, William McCurdy with the U.S. Post
Office, Edwin Patterson with state insurance commissioners, I. L. Sharfman with the Interstate
Commerce Commission, William Van Vleck with immigration.  Bontecou, Cheadle and
McCurdy never completed their manuscripts; the others proceeded at a glacial pace.  Patterson’s
book, already well underway when the administrative law project was organized in 1921, did not
22
appear until 1927.  Van Vleck published his study in 1932.   Sharfman’s aspirations for his ICC74
study proved so burdensome that he suffered a nervous breakdown, after which the
Commonwealth Fund decided to published the work piecemeal.  The first volume appeared in
1931; the last, in 1937.75
The book that made good on Frankfurter’s claims for the intensive study of administrative
law was Gerard Carl Henderson’s Federal Trade Commission (1924).  Henderson had graduated
from the Harvard Law School in 1916 after serving as president of the Law Review and writing a
prize-winning and subsequently published essay.  He was the rare top graduate who went into
government service, as a lawyer at the Federal Trade Commission, the War Shipping Board, and
the War Finance Corporation.  Along the way he wrote for the New Republic, economic journals,
and law reviews; ghostwrote portions of the report of Woodrow Wilson’s Second Industrial
Conference; and remained close to Frankfurter, who convinced his law school colleagues to hire
him, only to see the appointment vetoed by the Harvard Corporation.76
The offer to write a study of the Federal Trade Commission reached Henderson while in
private practice in New York City in July 1922.  He plunged in and, with his sterling legal
pedigree and former service at the commission, gained access to its files, lawyers, and
economists.  In September 1923 he sent a draft to Frankfurter that thrilled his mentor.  “I knew
that if we got Henderson to do the Trade Commission we’d get an outstanding piece of work,”
Frankfurter enthused to Farrand.  “But he has exceeded even my expectations–he has dug out
unexpectedly rich material from the records of the Commission, which bears on our main
problem, namely, the nature of administrative procedure and the dependability of its process in
accomplishing the ends for which it was established, and at the same time protecting individual
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interests affected by its action.”77
A work that better confirmed what Frankfurter already “knew, or at least felt,” about the
Federal Trade Commission could scarcely have been written.  By 1922 that flower of progressive
reform, while not yet blasted by the chairmanship of William Humphrey, had wilted
considerably.  The federal courts trusted neither its findings of fact nor its conclusions of law,
because they appeared in lifeless, formulaic opinions rather than compelling narratives.   Even78
before examining the commission’s files, Henderson had reached “one tentative, but fairly well
defined conclusion–viz., that the practice of the Commission in failing to file and publish written
opinions, including dissenting opinions, if any, is fundamentally vicious, and impairs
considerably the value of the work that the Commission has done from a juristic standpoint.” 
Although he later claimed to have had “not the slightest idea” what he would conclude, his
original, “tentative” conclusion would become the book’s principal finding.  According to
Henderson, the problem with the Federal Trade Commission was not Congress’s vague
delegation of executive power or the substance of its policies but its failure to display the legal
and economic reasons that led it to strike the balance of social interests as it did.79
The book was exactly the kind of narrowly focused, concrete, and reformist work that
Stone and Farrand had envisioned for the Commonwealth Fund’s administrative law project. 
Walter Fisher, the practitioner on the administrative committee, asked that a copy be sent to the
assistant secretary of agriculture responsible for administering the Packers and Stockyards Act
(under which he frequently litigated).  Every federal judge was sent a copy, as were leading Wall
Street lawyers and scholars of administrative law from New Haven to Calcutta.   FTC Chairman80
Hutson Thompson groused about the book but nonetheless revised the commission’s rules to
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meet its criticisms.  Roscoe Pound called it “a great contribution”; Stone offered Henderson a job
at Columbia on “handsome terms.”  Former commissioner George Rublee, among other
reviewers, joined Henderson in blaming the agency’s decline upon “its failure to convince the
courts that it has exercised an expert judgment in making its decisions.”81
Frankfurter seized upon Henderson’s success to renew his argument that “intensive
studies” were far preferable to studies “unnourished by the realities of ‘law in action’”–seemingly
a reference to Freund’s still uncompleted statutory survey.  “Judicial review” and “discretion”
could not be studied in isolation, he told Farrand; they must be studied “organically,” in light of
“the specific interests entrusted to a particular administrative organ,” as well as its history,
structure and “enveloping environment.”  “Only such a physiological study of Federal Trade
Commission administrative law and practice in action as Mr. Henderson has attempted could
have possibly disclosed the processes, the practices, the influential factors which make Federal
Trade Commission rulings,” Frankfurter crowed.82
While the Commonwealth Fund basked in the praise lavished on Henderson’s book,
Freund soldiered on with his statutory survey, plagued by illness and staggered by the enormity
of the task.   At last the massive manuscript of Administrative Powers over Persons and Property83
arrived at the Commonwealth Fund in the summer of 1926, in two parts.  The first, “analytical”
part, Freund explained, gave “what the Germans call a system of administrative law.”  It was a
painstaking, elaborate taxonomy of the forms and methods of administrative power over private
rights, as revealed in the legislation of New York, the United States, England and Germany.  The
second, “descriptive” part grounded the first in specific legislation under sixteen headings: public
utilities, shipping, banking, insurance, trade, labor, the professions, religion, education, political
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action, safety, health, morals, personal status, land use, and revenue.  Freund conceded that the
second part was “somewhat repellent in form” and “a laborious piece of work which few persons
will care to read through,” but he insisted it was necessary to “lend weight and support to the
exposition” of the first part.   The style was well, if delicately, characterized by an English84
scholar.  “The author’s Teutonic education produced an inexhaustible industry, a remarkable
capacity for inventive classification, and a power of subtle and penetrating analysis,” William
Robson wrote, but “one sometimes wished Freund had attempted to formulate some body of
conclusions at the end of his fine-spun web of conceptual exposition.”85
Farrand did not hide his dismay with a work that was so unlikely to prompt reform–or
even to be read cover-to-cover by anyone.   He turned to Pound for help.  The Harvard law dean86
reported that although the manuscript contained “a great deal of good material,” it was “so
written as to make the reading of it indescribably tedious.  I thought for a while that possibly bad
eyes had something to do with my difficulty in reading it, but I find I can read other things quite
as technical and still keep awake, while the labor of working out exactly what Freund means
thoroughly, phrase by phrase, sentence by sentence, and paragraph by paragraph, puts me to
sleep.”87
Attempts to persuade Freund to make the book “readable or attractive” proved
unsuccessful.  “My experience with Freund,” Farrand complained, “has been that he is so
sensitive that when I offer anything that might be interpreted as a criticism, he closes up his shell
and you might as well pour water on an oyster for all the effect it has.”  Pound, who had had
similarly unsatisfying exchanges, urged Farrand to publish the book notwithstanding its flaws. 
“A man of Freund’s calibre has some rights,” Pound advised, “and one of them is to put things as
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he wants them.  We ought to be glad to have so monumental a work on almost any terms.”88
Frankfurter agreed.  Although the book would “not commend itself even to the ‘learned
members’ of the teaching or the legal profession,” it would serve as “a rather recondite source for
the few specialists who are ready to quarry into it.”  Putting the best face on the situation, Farrand
told the Commonwealth Fund’s Board of Directors that although Freund’s monograph was “not
as interesting reading as the Henderson study of the Federal Trade Commission,” it was “a
perfectly impartial analysis of an unbelievable amount of detail” and would “reflect credit on the
author and upon those who have sponsored it.”89
Unacknowledged in these assessments, shrouded in Freund’s many qualifications and
concessions, was the message of the book: Americans had embraced the Rechtsstaat.  Freund
distinguished between two devices administrators used to resolve private rights: “the advance
checks” of licenses, permits, or certificates and the “corrective intervention” of administrative
orders or directives.  He was most confident of the “trend toward the reduction of discretion in
the grant of licensing powers.”  With a mental glance over his shoulder at Frankfurter, he insisted
that his conclusion was “not based on so unique an instance as the New York Raines Liquor Tax
Law of 1896 with its absolute elimination of all discretion.”  Even the Transportation Act of
1920, which seemingly endowed the Interstate Commerce Commission with “the widest type of
discretion” when deciding whether to grant certificates of convenience and necessity, also
required hearings.  It thereby set in motion a process of official justification that would
“inevitably tend to check and reduce discretion.”90
The case of administrative orders was more doubtful.  The Federal Trade Commission
Act was the most prominent example of a grant of discretion “as a means of finally evolving a
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definite rule.”  The decision to leave “the indeterminate concept of unfair competition” to the
commission to define through an accumulating body of precedents was “an admissible, if novel,
method of dealing with practices which appear detrimental to the public when it is difficult to
formulate with clearness either the evil or the remedy.”  The setting of rates for regulated
industries was harder to account for.  “The whole course of rate legislation and action under it
has been an effort to discover some principle of rate control.”  Regulators, it was apparently
assumed, would ultimately hit upon the true principle, which they could then apply with only the
same “margin of discretion” that judges exercised in resolving questions of fact.  Such a “‘trial-
and-error’ method” was acceptable; so even was a delegation that passed the buck for
propounding a standard “not fit to be set up as an avowed policy,” such as the de facto
cartelization of public utilities in a state that constitutionally banned monopolies.  Rate-setting,
Freund strongly implied, was none of those things; administrators acted solely out of
“expediency”; their discretion was “not displaceable by rule.”  It was “a legislative makeshift to
appease the demand for public control,” a “claim on the part of the state to be recognized as a
quasi-partner with paramount powers unattended by obligation or liability,” and “in a sense a
negation of law.”91
No economic issue was of greater concern to Frankfurter and other legal progressives in
the 1920s than the regulation of public utilities.    If, as Freund conceded, it was an exception to92
the general “tendency toward standardization” he discerned in the American statute book, it cast
doubt on his claim that Americans had rejected the delegation of discretionary political power to
administrative officials because of their “instinctive perception that it is essentially a negation of
the rule of law in administration.”   More likely he was projecting onto American legislators his93
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own disapproval of regulation that gave the state primary control over businesses but saddled
their owners with “all risk and responsibility.”   94
Freund had an answer: a systematic study of administration ought to survey the entire
statute book and not just the legislation that created the most controversial agencies.  His survey
revealed that American legislation used the license-granting power more than the order-issuing
power and that “licenses tend to become ministerial acts.”  Still, Freund could not quite dismiss
the possibility that he had only discovered what he had wanted to find.  “In ascertaining
tendencies it is not easy to divest the mind of bias or prejudice,” he confessed.  “Evidence of a
development that seems desirable easily appears persuasive or convincing.”   Could it be that the95
obscurity of Freund’s Administrative Powers was not simply the product of scholarly caution and
a “Teutonic” style but also the author’s doubts over whether he had in fact documented the
existence of an American Rechtsstaat?96
Certainly the few legal scholars who undertook a careful reading of the book were
unconvinced.  Northwestern University’s great law dean John Henry Wigmore had met an earlier
statement of Freund’s theories with the objection that “the bestowal of administrative discretion,
as contrasted with the limitation of power by a meticulous chain-work of inflexible detailed rules,
is the best hope for governmental efficiency.”   Frankfurter’s students took up the cry in their97
reviews of Administrative Powers.  Freund’s focus on private right to the exclusion of public
policy and the social interest was “one-sided,” Edwin Patterson complained.  “A Martian reading
this book would wonder why one group of humans (‘officials’) were taking so much trouble to
trouble another group of humans (‘private individuals’).”   Freund’s fear of discretion was the
product of his “fundamentally conservative point of view”; if discretion was always an evil,
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Patterson demanded, what “becomes of Mr. Justice Holmes’ ‘intuitions too subtle for any
articulate major premise’?”   John Dickinson took issue with Freund’s claim that discretion as98
other than a prelude to a rule was an “anomaly.”  Freund evidently believed that only legislatures
should exercise the “political” function of discretion and that in time rules could be developed for
all matters properly the subject of regulation by an administrative agency, Dickinson observed. 
These a priori assumptions were at least dubious and probably wrong.  In any event, by failing to
question them Freund had failed to demonstrate “the proper limits of administrative discretion.”99
If Freund required further evidence that his star had fallen and Frankfurter’s was
ascendant he need only consider the Commonwealth Fund’s actions in March 1927.  After
reluctantly authorizing the publication of Administrative Powers, the Legal Research Committee
enthusiastically invited Frankfurter to write the readable, synthetic account it had hoped for from
Freund.   The Harvard law professor declined the challenge, but a few years later he delivered a100
set of lectures, published as The Public and Its Government (1930), that called for government
not by rule-bound officials but by expert administrators free to act as their scientific “temper of
mind” led them.  “We have greatly widened the field of administrative discretion,” Frankfurter
declared.  If doing so has “opened the doors to arbitrariness,” the remedy was not a bright-line
rule but a professional civil service, fair procedures, and public scrutiny, and the criticism of “an
informed and spirited bar.”   He would restate his views in the preface to his casebook on
administrative law, published, with a coauthor, in 1932.101
In his review of Frankfurter’s casebook for the November 1932 issue of the Harvard Law
Review, Freund acknowledged that his attempt to transplant the Rechtsstaat in American soil had
failed.  “The reviewer’s own ideas about administrative law were undoubtedly influenced by
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Goodnow, who in his turn was influenced by continental jurists and treatises,” Freund wrote,
“but the process of transmission brought eliminations and substitutions; and now the presentation
of an entirely new plan appears to break the old tradition completely.”  The concession was all
the more poignant for being posthumous: Freund had died of a heart attack on October 20.  He
was spared seeing the New Deal’s vast expansion of administrative discretion or the Nazis’
perversion of the Rechtsstaat tradition.102
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To inaugurate a lectureship in honor of Ernst Freund in 1953, the Powers-That-Be at the
University of Chicago Law School turned to Felix Frankfurter.  The Supreme Court justice
prefaced his talk with praise for Freund as “a courtly man ‘of the old school’” and a pioneer in
the fields of administrative law and legislation.  Perhaps some in the audience suspected that the
two men had once been at loggerheads: how else would Frankfurter have known that Freund was
“a man of strong convictions,” whose “passion was behind his judgment and not in front of it”? 
Still, Frankfurter’s presence that evening, “as an act of pious gratitude to a great teacher of the
law,” probably created the impression that he and Freund had agreed on the fundamental tenets of
administrative law.  If so, Frankfurter would have eclipsed Freund by embracing him.103
In 1953 such a feat would have been easily accomplished because Freund had fallen from
the canon of scholarship on administrative law.  Frankfurter had reproduced a passage from
Administrative Powers in his 1932 casebook, but probably for its depiction of the Court of
Customs Appeals as an American equivalent of a continental administrative court and not for
31
Freund’s claim that customs law had evolved “more by specific statutory definition than by the
enlargement of administrative discretion.”   For a time, an occasional New Dealer would bring104
up Freund’s work only to dismiss it.  In 1936, for example, the political scientist Charles
Hyneman declared it “high time to question whether [Freund’s] hope of ultimate detailed
statutory regulation is not largely vain and illusory.”  A few years later, the law professor Ralph
Fuchs scoffed that Freund had no “other basis than a conceptual one” for his bias against
discretion.   Even these references ended after 1938, when New Dealers acquired a more105
tempting target in Roscoe Pound and his fulminations against “administrative absolutism.”  106
Neither James Landis, Walter Gellhorn, nor Jerome Frank mentioned Freund in their books on
administrative law.  In his 1940 casebook, Gellhorn did refer readers to Freund for help with a
knotty procedural point, but he omitted him from an introductory discussion of theorists of
administrative law.   In his postwar treatise, Kenneth C. Davis mentioned Freund and Goodnow107
as authors of “early works in the field” that were “of little usefulness on current problems.”   No108
wonder, then, that when reformers called for specific delegations of legislative power, heightened
judicial review, and mandatory rule-making in the late 1960s, as the law professor Richard
Stewart remarked, they “either failed to recognize or failed to acknowledge that Professor Freund
long ago anticipated all of their arguments.”   In The End of Liberalism (1969), for example,109
Theodore J. Lowi invoked not Freund’s Administrative Powers but Hayek’s “superb essay” on
the Rule of Law in The Road to Serfdom (1944).110
Freund’s ideas had fallen from view because they appealed to a particular group of
political actors at a particular moment, the urban middle class in its first flush of enthusiasm for
nonpartisan government.  Chicago was a vibrant center of progressivism; in no American city
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were professionals, university professors, and other reformers better organized or more
ambitious.  Between 1892 and 1919, they formed scores of civic clubs, “good government”
leagues, parks and planning associations, settlement houses, social service agencies, child welfare
societies, suffrage organizations, “social hygiene” societies, protective leagues for immigrants
and African Americans, criminal justice institutes, education committees, and associations for
public health, labor legislation, and social insurance.   Freund’s contributions to this reform111
community were remarkably extensive.  One historian dubbed him “the major legal expert of
Chicago reform”; another, “an unsung giant of progressivism.”   Freund worked for the112
extension of civil service and the adoption of the short ballot; he drafted a new charter for
Chicago in 1904 and the home rule provision in the failed Illinois constitution of 1920.  He was a
founder and officer of the Immigrants’ Protective League and wrote statute establishing it as a
public commission.  He reviewed every bill submitted for the approval of the Committee on
Social Legislation, a lobbying consortium created by a number of reform groups.  As a member
of the Illinois Association for Labor Legislation he drafted an employers’ liability bill and a
Sunday labor law; he joined labor reformers in defending a ten-hours law for women; he lectured
on social legislation to the School of Civics and Philanthropy and the University of Chicago’s
School of Social Service Administration, which he helped organized.  As Illinois’s representative
to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws he drafted many bills on
domestic relations and shepherded them through the Illinois legislature.   Liberalizing the law113
of illegitimacy was a special interest; Jane Addams likened his devotion to “what the Quakers
called a ‘concern.’”  Child welfare workers leaned on him heavily.  Even after leaving Chicago
for the Children’s Bureau in Washington, Grace Abbott, for example, anxiously sought Freund’s
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approval of regulations under the federal child labor law.114
Freund became, in the judgment of a settlement house worker, “one of the most useful
men in Chicago,” because he shared the basic political premises of progressive reform.   From115
his continental legal education, he derived much the same notion of a naturally harmonious
society that his fellow Chicagoans more commonly found in religion.  He shared his mentor
Goodnow’s distinction between politics and administration, which was a foundational belief
among progressive reformers.  Like Freund and Goodnow, they believed that legislators ought to
determine “the variable element of policy, the constant readjustment of political life and of
government to changing economic and social conditions.”   Clear rules preserved legislative116
expressions of social harmony by keeping potentially faithless administrators from compromising
with political bosses or developing “a bond of sympathy” with vested interests.   Without117
“precise terms of regulation,” Woodrow Wilson fretted in 1908, commission government
amounted to a turn “from law to personal power.”118
Although, as the historian Samuel Haber observed, “progressive reformers had optimism
in great store,” aby the early 1920s their supply was very nearly depleted.  The strikes, riots, and
other conflicts after the Armistice were devastating challenges to their vision of a naturally
harmonious society; in the new decade, political bosses reasserted their dominance of politics and
put the “improved machinery of state” to their own uses.   Public utilities and other119
corporations that originally resisted regulatory commissions embraced them as an alternative to
“strike bills” introduced by party politicians “for the purpose of holding up corporations” and as a
forum for informal negotiations in which they generally had the better of administrators.  120
Finally, reformers’ own experiences with public agencies showed just how poorly their model of
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a “rational, monocratic system of firmly arranged levels of hierarchical authority flowing from
superior to inferior roles” described the loose-jointed, heterogeneous, and conflict-ridden reality,
in which authority was as much a function of officials’ “qualifications and skills” as their
locations on an organizational chart.121
Felix Frankfurter proved to be a more reliable guide to the new American state.  From
1906 to 1911, he brought lawsuits under the Interstate Commerce Act as an assistant to United
States Attorney Henry Stimson; when Stimson became Secretary of War Frankfurter
accompanied him as his special counsel and the Law Officer of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. 
Frankfurter joined Harvard’s law faculty in 1914 but was back in Washington for the war,
installing proteges in bureau after bureau.  “Mr. Wilson has charge of foreign policy and Felix
seems to sponsor the rest of the government, ” marveled Harold Laski.  In short, Frankfurter122
thrived in a federal bureaucracy that little resembled the orderly visions of the political scientists.
Frankfurter acknowledged that open-ended delegations to administrators could lead to
“abuses of caprice and oppression,” but he countered that abstract and universal thinking
produced its own injustices.  The regulation of public utilities needed to be “flexible enough to
meet the flexibilities of life,” he told his students; the regulation of securities required broad
“standards of fair-dealing,” as no “legislative net” could cover the whole field.   If Freund123
would tether bureaucrats to legislative resolutions of social conflict, Frankfurter would free them
to exercise their “practical judgment in the adjustment of clashing economic and social interests,”
which they were to arrive at after performing “the quiet, detached, laborious task of disentangling
facts from fiction, of extracting reliable information from interested parties, of agreeing on what
is proof and what surmise.”  This was no mechanical process; it required “the imponderable
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qualities of imagination, judgment and discrimination.”  Ultimately, it depended upon the
professionalism of administrators and of the experts who advised them.124
Many political actors discovered that delegation to administrators better served their
interests than did detailed legislation.  Legislators often employed it to avoid the resolution of
politically divisive details.  Depending on who controlled the relevant agency, reformers or
business interests sometimes calculated that they could obtain a more favorable regulatory regime
than the legislature would have produced.  Middle-level administrators could acquire something
like prerogative power, and professionals could influence policymaking more pervasively.  125
Lawyers especially stood to benefit, to Freund’s dismay and Frankfurter’s delight.  Freund
thought that the relentless study of judicial opinions ruined lawyers as legislators and
administrators.  He believed, with Edmund Burke, that “legislators ought to do what lawyers
cannot.”   Frankfurter believed almost the reverse.  The government lawyer was “inevitably126
thrown into the heart of the policy-making process and of necessity has an important, and often a
controlling, voice in the major issues of his department or agency,” he maintained.  “By tradition
and training,” the lawyer is “the expert in affairs.”  127
Such views were of course congenial to Frankfurter’s protégés who worked in New Deal
and wartime Washington and created the modern regulatory law practice during the Truman
administration.  James Landis, the second chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
argued that modern regulation required not “generalizations and principles” but the “practical
judgment” of “men bred to the facts.”   The legal historian Willard Hurst, who left an academic128
post to write labor standards clauses into overseas procurement contracts during World War II,
called lawyers the experts “whose skill it is to make social use of the experts in all other fields.” 
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He ranked them as “law makers” of equal stature with legislatures, courts, constitutional
conventions, and executive officials.   In a widely noted set of lectures published in 1952,129
Charles Horsky, a New Dealer at a leading Washington law firm, set out a complementary view
of private practitioners as a sine qua non of effective governance.   Scholarly and popular130
attacks on command-and-control regulation did ultimately produce more specific delegations in
the environmental legislation of the 1970s.  Even then, however, most reformers assumed that
administration was a pluralist process of interest-group politics and attempted to make agencies
more representative “mini-legislatures.”131
In his great mid-twentieth-century synthesis of America legal history, Willard Hurst
paused to give his own assessment of Freund.  “Sympathetic with the growth of the
administrative process, but also distrustful of the delegation of broad policy decisions,” Freund
“predicted in 1928 that legislatures would take back the leadership of policy as they gained
experience in new fields of regulation.”  Although experience had not borne Freund out, Hurst
still found a valuable message in his work, that legislators should not surrender policymaking to
administrators but should use “the contributions of the executive” in formulating public policy
and writing legislation.   Administrative discretion was neither the inevitable concomitant of132
modern governance nor the first, fatal step on “the road to serfdom”; it could coexist with
directives to administrators to advance specific, legislatively expressed concerns.  That one can
attack administrative discretion and remain within the broad boundaries of the American reform
tradition is a useful lesson for today’s critics of financial bailouts and other combinations of
public and private power.
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